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CONFIDENTIALITY AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:
NEW GUIDELINES FOR VIRGINIA ATTORNEYS UNDER
THE REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The American Bar Association (ABA) created the Commission on Eval-
uation of Professional Standards (Kutak Commission)' in 1978 to develop a
comprehensive new model code of professional conduct for attorneys.2 The
Kutak Commission drafted the ABA Model Rules of Professional conduct
(Model Rules) to serve as a model for state courts and bar associations in
enacting state codes of professional conduct. 3 In anticipation of the first
report of the Kutak Commission in 1979, the Virginia State Bar (VSB) ap-
pointed the Special Committee to Study the Virginia Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (Special Committee).4 In 1983, the Special Committee completed
its three year task of reevaluating and updating the former Virginia Code of
1. See Outline of Presentations, Third Annual Disciplinary Conference, Richmond, Va. 4
(Sept. 7, 1983). The American Bar Association (ABA) appointed the Commission on Evaluation
of Professional Standards (the Commission) in 1978 to evaluate the pertintency of the 1969 ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA Code). Id. The Commission was renamed the
Kutak Commission in honor of its original chairman, Robert J. Kutak, after his death in 1983.
See Special Report-New ABA Model Rules, 15 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1564, 1565 (Aug.
12, 1983) (reporting adoption of Kutak Commission's Model Rules at ABA August, 1983 Annual
Meeting).
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Preface (i) (Discussion Draft 1980). The
Kutak Commission recognized that a comprehensive reformation of the code of professional
ethics was necessary in light of the changes in the law that occurred in the 1970's. Id. During the
last decade, decisions of the Supreme Court, statutory enactments, and opinions of the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility contributed to the continuing
evolution of ethical thought. Id. The ABA House of Delegates created the Standing Committee
on Evaluation of Ethical Standards to express opinions on proper professional and judicial con-
duct, either on the committee's own initiative or when requested to do so by a member of the
Bar. See Informal Ethics Opinions, Vol. 1, 1 (1975). An Informal Opinion is a response to a
specific inquiry relating to a particular set of facts. Id. at 2. In contrast, a Formal Opinion deals
with a subject matter of general interest to the Bar. Id. Thus, the goal of the Kutak Commission
was to completely re-evaluate the fundamental tenets of ethics and self-regulation in the legal
profession. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preface (ii) (Discussion Draft 1980).
3. See Castles & Foster, The New Model Rules: Conflicts and Lawyer Disqualification,
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 6, 1984, at 15, col. I [hereinafter cited as Conflicts and Lawyer Disqualifica-
tion]. Only state entities such as state courts or state bar associations can give legal effect to the
provisions of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules). Id.
4. See Outline of Presentations, Third Annual Disciplinary Conference, Richmond, Va.
(Sept. 7, 1983) at 5 (Virginia State Bar (VSB) appointed committee to propose needed changes in
Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)). Virginia State Bar (VSB) President William
Baskin instructed members of the "Special Committee to Study Virginia Code of Professional
Responsibility" (Special Committee) to consider developments in current case law and to analyze
the work of the Kutak Commission. Id. Members of the VSB Special Committee included
Roderick B. Mathews, Chairperson, of Richmond, John Jay Corson, IV, of Alexandria, William
W. Eskridge, of Abingdon, Philip J. Hirschkop, of Alexandria, James N. Garrett, Jr., of Ports-
mouth, Peter C. Manson, of Charlottesville, William B. Poff, of Roanoke, William F. Roeder,
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Professional Responsibility (CPR).' The Special Committee submitted its re-
commendations to the Supreme Court of Virginia and on June 1, 1983, the
Supreme Court adopted the revised Virginia CPR that became effective in
Virginia on October 1, 1983.' In doing so, Virginia became one of the first
states to reject the new ABA Model Rules proposed by the Kutak Commis-
sion. 7 Consequently, the revised Virginia CPR presents a number of striking
contrasts to the new ABA Model Rules both in form and substance.' In addi-
tion, the revised Virginia CPR differs from the former Virginia CPR in
several substantive areas and presents new standards of ethical conduct for
the Virginia practitioner.9 Significantly, the revised Virginia CPR promul-
gates new guidelines for attorney conduct in the areas of confidentiality
Jr., of Fairfax. See President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEWS, Nov. 1982, at 11. In addition, Assistant
Attorney General of Virginia Leonard Hopkins represented the Attorney General's Office, and
Michael Rigsby served as Bar Counsel. Id. The Special Committee's objective was to conduct a
comprehensive review of the former Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) in light
of the developing law on professional legal ethics. See Report of the Virginia State Bar Special
Committee to Study the Code of Professional Responsibility, at 3 (April 1, 1981) [hereinafter
cited as Special Committee Report].
5. See President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEWS, June, 1983 at 10, 11 (describing work of VSB
Special Committee to Study Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility (Special Committee)).
As the state bar association, the VSB has the power to amend the rules governing ethical conduct
of the legal profession. Id. The VSB directed the Special Committee to evaluate a number of dev-
elopments in the law that affected self-regulation of the legal profession. Outline of Present-
ations, Third Annual Disciplinary Conference, Richmond, Va. (Sept. 7, 1983) at 3; see, e.g.,
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 366-67 (1975) (first amendment protects attorneys'
right to advertise and to solicit employment); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793
(1975) (Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits minimum fee schedules set by Bar Associations);
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975) (lawyer participating in
criminal case may not make extra-judicial statements regarding case when comments may
threaten judicial process). As a result of litigation that occurred during the 1970's, the Virginia
Supreme Court had amended the former Virginia CPR to reflect advancements in rules govern-
ing attorney advertising, specialization, and handling of client funds. See President's Page, 31
VA. B. NEWS, June, 1983 at 10. In addition, from 1979-1982 the Supreme Court of Virginia
enacted extensive new rules regulating a lawyer's duties to prevent the unauthorized practice of
law. Id.; see also REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 3 (1983). Con-
sequently, the former Virginia CPR had deviated sharply from the 1969 ABA Model Code, and
no longer presented a cohesive, concise set of guidelines for professional conduct. Outline of
Presentations, Third Annual Disciplinary Conference, Richmond, Va. (Sept. 7, 1983) at 3. Thus,
the VSB sought to enact a comprehensive, up-to-date revision of the former Virginia CPR. Id.
6. REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, reprinted in 31 VA. B.
NEws, June 1983, at 29. Currently, the revised Virginia CPR is not published as a separate docu-
ment, and therefore is not readily accessible to the public or the bar. See Special Committee
Report, supra note 4, at 5. The VSB Special Committee recommended that the revised CPR
be published in looseleaf form in the same manner as the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. Id.
7. See Special Committee Report, supra note 4, at 4 (noting that Special Committee re-
jected Kutak Commission's model for restructuring Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR)).
8. See President's Page, 31 VA. BAR. NEWS, June 1983, at 12.
9. See Outline of Presentations, Third Annual Disciplinary Conference, Richmond, Va.
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(Canon Four) and conflicts of interest (Canons Five and Nine).' 0
The revised Virginia CPR replaces the former Virginia CPR that gov-
erned the Virginia legal profession since 1971.1' During the 1970's, judicial
decisions which changed the standards for attorney advertising and fee setting
practices forced Virginia and other states to amend existing ethical
standards.' 2 As a result, the former Virginia CPR, as well as the ethical codes
of other states, had drifted in significant respects from the 1969 ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code) upon which most states
originally modeled their codes.' 3 In addition, judicial decisions appeared that
completely invalidated sections of the 1969 ABA Model Code. 4 Thus, the
VSB recognized a clear need to assess the pertinancy of Virginia's code of
ethics and consequently appointed the Special Committee in 1979 to review
and revise the former Virginia CPR."
(Sept. 7, 1983) at 6-8 (listing important substantive changes in revised Virginia Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (CPR)). The VSB Disciplinary Conference featured a substantive review of
the nine canons of the revised Virginia CPR. See 32 VA. B. NEws, Sept. 1983, at 1, col. 1.
10. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONS1lLITY Canons 4, 5 & 9 (1983).
Compare VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canons, 4, 5 & 9 (1970) with MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.6-1.11 (1983). See also infra text accompanying notes
58-90 (discussion of client confidentiality under Canon 4 of revised CPR) and notes 91-162 (dis-
cussion of conflicts of interest under Canons 5 and 9 of revised CPR).
11. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983). Prior to 1971,
the 1908 version of the American Bar Association's (ABA) Canons of Professional Ethics pro-
vided guidelines for attorney conduct in Virginia. See Outline of Presentations, Third Annual
Disciplinary Conference, Richmond, Va. (Sept. 7, 1983) at I (introduction to revised Virginia
CPR). The state of Alabama drafted the first code of ethics in the United States in 1887. Id. The
ABA based its 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, the first national model code, on the original
Alabama statement of ethics. Id. Members of the Virginia State Bar Association subscribed vol-
untarily to the 1908 ABA model prior to 1938. Id. In 1938, the Virginia General Assembly
created the Virginia State Bar and the Virginia bar association formally adopted the 1908 ABA
model as the code of ethics for Virginia attorneys. Id. at 2. Thirty-one years later, the 1969 ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility superseded the 1908 model canons of ethics. Id. at 4. The
Supreme Court of Virginia adopted the 1969 ABA Code almost verbatim, and the ABA Code be-
came effective in Virginia on January 1, 1971. Id.
12. President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEws, June, 1983, at 10; see supra note 5 and accom-
panying text (citing United States Supreme Court decisions on first amendment and antitrust
principles which affected self-regulation of professional conduct by attorneys).
13. See President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEWS, June, 1983, at 11. The alterations to the former
Virginia CPR reflected the results of litigation in such areas as extrajudicial statements, advertis-
ing, and personal solicitation of employment. Id. at I0.
14. See id. at 11. Courts have overruled the ABA Code's provisions on attorney advertis-
ing, extrajudicial statements, and the role of paralegals within the legal system. Id. at 10; see also
supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting recent United States Supreme Court decisions affect-
ing self-regulation of legal profession).
15. See id. at 10. In addition, the VSB recognized the increasing awareness of the legal pro-
fession to ethical problems, and the need to set consistent guidelines for attorney conduct. Id.
Moreover, the work of the Kutak Commission in its efforts to redesign the ABA Model Code
motivated the VSB to revise the former Virginia CPR. 1d; see also supra note 4 and accompany-
ing text (anticipating first report of Kutak Commission).
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The VSB assigned to the Special Committee a three-fold task. 6 First, the
VSB directed the Special Committee to bring the former Virginia CPR into
compliance with judicial precedent that had developed since the enactment of
the 1969 ABA Model Code.' 7 Second, the VSB instructed the Special Com-
mittee to create a useful resource document on professional conduct for the
Virginia practitioner. 8 Third, the VSB charged the Special Committee with
the duty to preserve within the revised CPR the high ethical standards of the
legal profession.' 9 From 1979 through 1983, the VSB Special Committee
reviewed commentary on current ethical problems, examined ethics opinions
of the ABA, evaluated the ABA Model Rules proposed by the Kutak Com-
mission, and held public hearings on the revised Virginia CPR.2" One of the
major issues under Special Committee consideration was whether to wait for
the adoption of the final draft of the ABA Model Rules or to proceed in-
dependently to update the former Virginia CPR.2 ' Because of the inconsisten-
cies that existed within the former Virginia CPR and the increasing sensitivity
of the legal profession to ethical problems, 2  the VSB Special Committee
decided that Virginia should proceed promptly and independently to reform
the Virginia CPR.23
In retrospect, the decision of the VSB Special Committee to proceed with
an autonomous revision of Virginia's code of ethics has proven wise., The
16. See id.; see also Special Committee Report, supra note 4, at 3 (stating objectives of
Special Committee in reviewing former Virginia CPR).
17. See President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEws, June 1983, at 10; see also supra notes 5 & 13
(discussing recent judicial decisions on attorney ethics that invalidated portions of 1969 ABA
Code).
18. See President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEWS, June 1983, at 10; see also Special Committee
Report, supra note 4, at 5 (noting that one goal of Special Committee was to present streamlined,
simplified document for use by attorneys). The VSB Special Committee also included as an ob-
jective the aim to make the revised CPR a better learning resource for law students. Id. at 4.
19. See President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEWS, June 1983, at 10.
20. See id. at 11 (describing Special Committee's evaluation process of Virginia CPR). The
VSB Special Committee proposed and drafted amendments to the Virginia CPR and presented
recommendations to the VSB Council in four separate installments. Id. On April 1, 1981 the
Special Committee filed its original report with recommendations. Outline of Presentations,
Third Annual Disciplinary Conference, Richmond, Va. (Sept. 7, 1983) at 6. In addition, the
Special Committee held public hearings on the revised CPR in Richmond on June 20, 1981 and in
Virginia Beach on Sept. 9, 1981. Id. The Special Committee submitted supplemental recommen-
dations on Oct. 1, 1981 and February 1, 1982 before filing its final recommendations in June,
1982. Id.
21. See President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEWS, June 1983, at 11; see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 23-26 (discussing controversy surrounding adoption of ABA Model Rules).
22. See President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEWS, June 1983, at 10 (noting increasing public
awareness of sensitive ethical issue such as client confidentiality).
23. See President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEWS, June 1983, at 11; see also Special Committee
Report, supra note 4, at 4 (rejecting Kutak Commission's proposed ABA Model Rules as unnec-
essary restructuring of existing Code).
24. See President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEWS, June 1983, at 11. The VSB correctly anticipated
the controversy surrounding the proposed ABA Model Rules and the problems the ABA would
face in obtaining unanimous state approval of the Model Rules. Id.
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ABA Model Rules proposed by the Kutak Commission had generated nearly
six years of controversy and heated debate.25 As a result, the ABA did not ac-
cept the final revision of the Model Rules until August 2, 1983, almost four
years after the VSB appointed the Special Committee to review the former
Virginia CPR.2" Moreover, despite the addition of numerous compromise
amendments to the ABA Model Rules, several state delegations continue to
oppose the ABA's endorsement of the Model Rules.27 Thus, the likelihood ex-
ists that had Virginia followed the format of the new ABA Model Rules, the
25. See, e.g., Freedman, New Ethics Proposal is Better, But Still Not Good Enough, 96
L.A. DAILY J. (July 7, 1983) at 4, col. 3 (recommending retention of 1969 ABA Model Code);
THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT, Preamble (Roscoe Pound-American Trial
Lawyer's Foundation) (Revised Draft 1982) (describing proposed ABA Model Rules as funda-
mentally flawed); Special Report-New ABA Model Rules, 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1564
(Aug. 12, 1983) (noting controversy surrounding adoption of ABA Model Rules). The proposed
ABA Model Rules created controversy on a number of levels. See Freedman, supra, at 4, col. 3.
First, some critics maintained that the Kutak Commission exceeded its authority since the ABA
directed the Kutak Commission only to revise the present ABA Code and not to create a new set
of ethical rules. Id. Upon reviewing the inconsistencies of the 1969 ABA Model Code, however,
the Kutak Commission decided to draft an entirely new document. Id. Second, since the Model
Rules contain multiple changes in phrasing and substance, attorneys can expect another decade
of reinterpretation and amendment. Id. The confusion resulting from an additional decade of
interpretation of the Model Rules will be compounded by the fact that many states will not ac-
cept the Model Rules. Id. Thus, lawyers practicing in some states will be governed by the 1969
ABA Model Code, while lawyers practicing in other states will be subject to the new ABA Model
Rules. Id. As a result, professional discipline will be unpredictable and inconsistent, and may
produce considerable potential for unfair results to attorneys in malpractice actions. Id. Third,
some critics have argued that the new ABA Model Rules provide inadequate guidelines in sub-
stantive areas such as client confidentiality and extra-judicial statements by attorneys. Id. at 4,
col. 4 & 5.
Members of the ABA's Kutak Commission, on the other hand, anticipated that a number
of state jurisdictions would act rapidly to enact equivalents of the new ABA Model Rules into
state law. See A New Ethics Code, 70 A.B.A.J. 13, 14 (January, 1984). To date, however, no
states have adopted the new ABA Model Rules as a code of ethics. See NAT'L REP. ON ETHICS &
PROF. RESP., vol. 1-4; see also infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing new ABA
Model Rules provisions on confidentiality and extra-judicial statements).
26. See Special Report-New ABA Model Rules, 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1564
(Aug. 12, 1983) (reporting adoption of ABA Model Rules by ABA Convention on Aug. 2, 1983);
Special Committee Report, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that VSB appointed Special Committee in
September, 1978 to study work of Kutak Commission).
27. See Special Report-New ABA Model Rules, 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1564,
1565 (Aug. 12, 1983) (statement of Charles W. Kettlewell of National Organization of Bar
Counsel noting lack of consensus in states for adoption of ABA Model Rules). The state bar as-
sociations of California and Florida both continue to oppose the adoption of the ABA Model
Rules, but for contrasting reasons. Id. at 1565. The Florida Bar, whose state rules require the dis-
closure of client confidences in a number of situations, opposes Model Rule 1.6 as overly protec-
tive of client confidentiality. Id. The California delegation, in contrast, opposes the adoption of
the ABA Model Rules because the Model Rules do not afford client confidences sufficient pro-
tection. Id.; see also 46 Ky. BENCH & BAR 21(2) (Oct. 1982) (noting opposition of Kentucky State
Bar to new ABA Model Rules); supra note 25 and accompanying text (citing failure of states to
enact new ABA Model Rules).
1984] 1581
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1577
final product of the VSB Special Committee might have met with controversy
and resistance from the Virginia Bar.28
In addition, practical reasons supported the VSB's decision not to await
the final promulgation of the ABA Model Rules.2 9 The VSB wanted to design
the revised Virginia CPR to function as a useful resource tool for the legal
practitioner °. 3  The structure of the ABA Model Rules present a complete
departure from the organization of both the 1969 ABA Model Code and
former Virginia CPR.3 ' Under the design of the new ABA Model Rules, a rule
was rewritten even if the substance of an ethical standard or disciplinary pro-
cedure had not changed.3 2 Consequently, if the VSB had waited and followed
the composition of the ABA Model Rules, Virginia attorneys would have had
to learn an entire code rather than merely familiarize themselves with the revi-
sions.3 3 In addition, strong support existed within the VSB to retain the struc-
ture of the former Virginia CPR in order to facilitate enforcement of the dis-
ciplinary rules.3 The VSB Special Committee anticipated that if the revised
CPR had followed the design of the new ABA Model Rules, enforcement
would be hindered by a lack of guidance from judicial interpretation and
ethics opinions.
35
To effectuate the goals set out by the VSB, the Special Committee and the
Virginia Supreme Court chose to retain within the revised CPR the Disciplin-
ary Rule format promulgated by the 1969 ABA Model Code and adopted by
28. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting controversy surrounding creation and
adoption of new ABA Model Rules).
29. See President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEWS, June 1983, at 10, 11.
30. See Special Committee Report, supra note 4, at 5. The Special Committee noted that
case reporting systems are geared to 1969 ABA Model Code subject and numerical format, and
that nearly all Virginia attorneys have practiced under or studied the 1969 ABA Model Code for-
mat. Id. Thus, the new ABA Model Rules would be unfamiliar to Virginia attorneys in both con-
tent and form. Id.
31. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) (instituting complete depar-
ture from design of 1969 ABA Model Code) with REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY (1983) (following structure of 1969 ABA Model Code).
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preface (i) (Discussion Draft 1980)
(noting Kutak Commission's determination that comprehensive reformulation of 1969 ABA
Model was needed).
33. See Outline of Presentations, Third Annual Disciplinary Conference, Richmond, Va.
(Sept. 7, 1983) at 5 (Kutak Commission's proposed ABA Model Rules contained complete
change of language and format); see also supra note 30 and accompanying text (noting reasons
for maintaining format of former Virginia CPR).
34. See President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEWS, June 1983, at 10-11 (VSB Committee on Ethics,
Bar Counsel, and District Committees advocated preservation of existing format in Virginia
CPR). The format and subject matter presented in the former Virginia CPR had been the subject
of more than 12 years of interpretation by various committees of the VSB. Id. at 11. Conse-
quently, to reject the format of the former Virginia CPR and embrace the ABA Model Rules
would invalidate much of the code interpretation of the last decade. See id. at 11. Thus, discip-
linary agencies of the VSB would be left with no guidance in interpreting new provisions of the
Virginia CPR. See id.
35. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (describing need for consistency in structure of
former and revised Virginia CPR to ensure enforcement of disciplinary rules.)
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the former Virginia CPR.36 The Disciplinary Rule format presents concrete
standards for professional conduct in the attorney's relationship both with
the public and within the legal system.3" The framers of the new ABA Model
Rules, in contrast, sought to establish ethical guidelines for the legal profes-
sion by defining an attorney's responsibilities as an advocate, an advisor, an
officer of the legal system, and a public citizen with special responsibility for
maintaining the quality of justice.
3
1
The Disciplinary Rule format followed by the Revised Virginia CPR of-
fers guidelines for attorney conduct in three separate but interrelated parts.
9
The revised CPR presents a series of nine Canons, each with subcategories of
Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations. 40 The Canons are statements
of axiomatic norms which express in general terms the standards of profes-
sional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships within the legal pro-
fession.4 ' The Disciplinary Rules are mandatory standards which state the
minimum level of ethical conduct demanded by the profession.4 2 If an at-
torney's conduct falls below the minimum standard, he or she becomes sub-
ject to disciplinary action.43 The Ethical Considerations are nonmandatory,
aspirational guidelines which represent the idealized ethical model of conduct
that every attorney should strive to emulate. 44 The Ethical Considerations
36. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983) (retaining tradi-
tional CPR format consisting of Canons, Disciplinary Rules (DR) and Ethical Considerations
(EC)); Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969); see also Special Committee
Report, supra note 4, at 4-5 (noting reasons for retaining ABA Model Code format).
37. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1983). One of
the purposes of the Revised Virginia CPR is to facilitate the lawyer's understanding of his or her
function within the legal system. See Outline of Presentations, Third Annual Disciplinary Con-
ference, Richmond, Va. (Sept. 7, 1983) at 8 (quoting Preamble to 1969 ABA Model Code). In
addition, each lawyer is obligated to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct. Id.
38. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983). The format of the new
ABA Model Rules focuses on a lawyer's ethical responsibilities by defining a lawyer's function in
a number of roles. Id. at 1. As advisor, a lawyer should provide each client with an informed
understanding of the client's legal rights. Id. As advocate, a lawyer should assert diligently the
client's position while being honest with the tribunal. Id. As negotiator, a lawyer should seek a
result advantageous to the client but consistent with the requirements of fair dealing. Id. In addi-
tion, a lawyer may serve as intermediary between clients by seeking to reconcile the clients' diver-
gent interests. Id.
39. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1983).
40. Id. The former Virginia CPR used a format similar to the format of the revised CPR
but placed the Ethical Considerations directly after the Canons, followed by the Disciplinary
Rules without comment or annotation. See Special Committee Report, supra note 4, at 4.
41. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1983). The
Canons embody the general concepts from which the Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considera-
tions are derived. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The revised Virginia CPR dictates that the Disciplinary Rules are to be applied uni-
formly to all attorneys within the framework of a fair trial. Id. See In re Buffalo, 390 U.S. 544,
550 (attorney is entitled to procedural due process when penalty or disbarment may result), reh'g
denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968).
44. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1983).
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constitute a body of principles upon which an attorney can rely for guidance
in problematic ethical situations. '5
The new ABA Model Rules, on the other hand, have adopted a Restate-
ment format with a new numbering system and regrouping of subject
matter.4 6 The Restatement format consists of eight substantive Rules with ex-
tensive Comment following each rule." Some of the Rules are mandatory and
define proper ethical conduct subject to professional discipline.48 Many of the
Rules, however, are permissive and define areas in which the lawyer has pro-
fessional discretion. 9 The Comment accompanying each Rule explains and il-
lustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule."0 Although the Model Rules
define minimum standards for professional legal conduct, the framers of the
new ABA Model Rules intended the Rules to function as a general framework
for the ethical practice of law,5" rather than as a rigid code of proper profes-
sional behavior."
The revised Virginia CPR differs from the ABA Model Rules not only in
format but also in substantive areas of the law regarding attorney conduct."
For example, the revised Virginia CPR redefines the standard used to measure
attorney misconduct," and introduces new provisions permitting attorney
45. See id.; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1969) (as
amended February, 1980), at n.7 (noting lawyer's need to understand reasons underlying stan-
dards of professional conduct).
46. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr (1983); President's Page, 31 VA. B.
NEWS,'June, 1983, at 10, 12 (new ABA Model Rules have adopted Restatement format). The new
format focuses on a lawyer's ethical responsibilities by defining the lawyer's functions in a
number of roles. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) (delineating lawyer's func-
tions as advocate, counselor, and intermediary); see also supra note 38 (defining attorney's roles
under new ABA Model Rules).
47. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.1-8.1 and Comments (1983)
(reprinted in 69 A.B.A.J. 1 (Nov. 1983)).
48. See id. at 3 (Preamble) (defining scope of ABA Model Rules).
49. See id.
50. See id. The Comments of the ABA Model Rules are intended as guides to interpreta-
tion of the Rules, but the text of each rule is authoritative. Id.
51. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preface (ii) (Discussion Draft 1980). The
members of the Kutak Commission believed that "no worthwhile human activity" can be or
should be defined completely by legal rules. Id. Thus, the Model Rules recognize the inherent
limitations on self-regulation of the legal profession and do not attempt to exhaust the moral and
ethical considerations that every attorney confronts. Id.
52. See id. (noting inherent limitations on self-regulation of legal profession).
53. See President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEWS, June 1983, at 12 (noting differences between
Virginia CPA and ABA Model Rules regarding confidentiality, duty of attorney to prevent
unauthorized practice of law, and conflicts of interest); see also Outline the Presentations, Third
Annual Disciplinary Conference, Richmond, Va. (Sept. 7, 1983) at 6-8 (listing important
substantive changes in revised Virginia CPR); infra notes 58-90 and 91-162 and accompanying
text (discussing contrasts in ABA Model Rules and revised Virginia CPR).
54. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (1983) (new
standard for judging attorney misconduct is "fitness to practice law"). Under the former
Virginia CPR, an attorney could be disqualified for misconduct due to "moral turpitude" or
"prejudice to the administration of justice." See VIRIGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILI-
TY DR 1-102 (1971). The Virginia Supreme Court in Cord v. Gibb expressly rejected the moral
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adivertising and solicitation." In addition, the revised Virginia CPR pro-
mulgates standards of conduct which differ from both the ABA Model Rules
and the former Virginia CPR in the important areas of confidentiality (Canon
Four) and conflicts of interest (Canons Five and Nine).
5 6
The new version of Canon Four in the revised Virginia CPR gives a broad
meaning to the term "confidential information."-7 Canon Four of the revised
CPR directs an attorney to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client. 8
The term "confidences" refers to information protected by the at-
torney/client privilege under the applicable rules of evidence. 9 The term
"secrets" includes any other information gained in the professional relation-
ship whether or not the client stipulates that the information be held invio-
late. 60 The general rule of Canon Four of the revised CPR precludes an at-
torney from revealing client confidences and secrets in most circumstances
and reemphasizes the importance of client confidentiality as defined in the
former Virginia CPR.6 In contrast, the new ABA Model Rules present a
turpitude standard and mandated "fitness to practice law" as the appropriate standard for deter-
mining attorney misconduct. See 219 Va. 1019, 1021 (1979). Thus, the VSB Special Committee
incorporated the "fitness to practice law" standard into Canon 1 of the revised CPR, which
governs the integrity and competence of the legal profession. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(3) (1983).
55. See id. at DR 2-101(A) (revised CPR allows lawyer advertising so long as communica-
tion is not deceptive, misleading or fraudulent).
56. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canons 4, 5, & 9 (1983);
see also infra notes 58-90 and accompanying text (discussing differences in rules on client con-
fidentiality in revised Virginia CPR and new ABA Model Rules) and notes 91-162 and accompa-
nying text (describing contrasts between revised CPR and new ABA Model Rules regarding rules
on conflicts of interest).
57. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1983). Canon
4 dictates that an attorney must preserve confidential information, and defines confidential in-
formation as the confidences and secrets of the client. Id.; see also Outline of Presentations,
Third Annual Disciplinary Conference, Richmond, Va. (Sept. 7, 1983), Report on Canon Four
of the Revised Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility (comments of Thomas L. Shaffer,
Director, Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington & Lee University School of Law).
58. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1983).
59. See id. at DR 4-101(A). The directives of Canon 4 include but are not limited to infor-
mation protected by the attorney/client privilege as defined by the rules of evidence. See id. at
EC 4-4. The State of Virginia has not enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, so the law of evi-
dence in Virginia is defined by common law decisions. See C. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN
VIRIGINIA, Introduction at xvii-xviii (1983). Under the law of evidence in Virginia, communica-
tions protected by the attorney/client privilege are subject to four limitations. Id. at 160. First,
an attorney/client relationship must have existed at the time of the disclosure of the confidential
information. Id. at 160. Second, the client must have intended the communication to be held in
confidence. Id. at 161. Third, the communication must relate to the matter about which the
client consulted the attorney. Id. Fourth, the communication must have been made while the
client was consulting the attorney for a legitimate purpose. Id.
60. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1983). A
secret includes any information that is potentially embarrassing or detrimental to the welfare of
the client. Id.
61. Id. at DR 4-101(B)(1). Canon 4 also precludes an attorney from using a confidence or
secret to a client's disadvantage. Id. at DR 4-101(B)(2). In addition, Canon 4 prohibits an at-
torney from using client confidences or secrets to the attorney's own advantage, or for the ad-
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broader definition of client confidentiality than the definition contained in
the revised CPR.62 Model Rule 1.6 applies the attorney/client privilege re-
quirement to all information about the client relating to the representation.
63
Thus, information must be kept confidential even if the attorney acquired the
information before the attorney/client relationship existed or after its ter-
mination.6"
The Disciplinary Rules of Canon Four of the revised CPR, however, pro-
vide an attorney with the option to reveal confidential information in a few
situations.65 For example, an attorney may reveal confidences or secrets in
any case if a client consents after full disclosure of the possible adverse conse-
quences. 66 An attorney also may disclose a client's confidential information
when directed by a court order.67 In addition, when a client has perpetrated a
fraud against a third party or accused an attorney of wrongful conduct, the
attorney has the option to reveal client confidences or secrets in relevant
areas." The corresponding provisions of the ABA Model Rules, however,
vantage of a third party, unless the client consents after full disclosure. Id. at DR 4-101(B)(3).
62. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Code Comparison) (1983)
(reprinted in 69 A.B.A.J. 1, 8 (Nov. 1983)) (noting that principle of client confidentiality is
enlarged in new ABA Model Rules).
63. See id. at 8 (Code Comparison).
64. Id. Model Rule 1.6 does not require the client to dictate that information be kept con-
fidential, and does not permit the lawyer to speculate as to whether or not particular information
may be embarrassing or detrimental to the client. Id. Furthermore, Model Rule 1.6 avoids the
constricted definition of confidence as construed by some courts. Id.; see, e.g., Allegaert v.
Perot, 434 F. Supp. 790, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (client must have "reasonable expectation" that
attorney will keep information confidential or attorney cannot be subject to disciplinary action
for violation of Canon Four); Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 872-73 (W.D.
Wis. 1977) (when lawyer represents two clients in same suit, clients' communication are not
privileged as to other client and are not confidences); City of Wichita v. Chapman, 521 P.2d 589,
596 (Kan. (1974) (client must intend that information be confidential and information must be
private in nature before attorney has duty not to disclose).
65. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(c) (1983).
66. See id. at DR 4-101(c)(1). The Special Committee viewed full disclosure to mean that
the attorney must fully advise the client of all information the attorney intends to reveal. See
Special Committee Report, supra note 4, at 26. The client must know to whom the information
will be revealed, and the attorney should fully apprise the client of any and all legal consequences
which may result from the disclosure. Id.
67. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2). The
rule under the former Virginia CPR allowed an attorney to reveal client confidences as permitted
under the Disciplinary Rules of Canon Four of the former CPR. See VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (1971). The Special Committee amended DR 4-101(C) be-
cause of the belief that the Virginia CPR should not operate as a vehicle for disclosure of client's
confidences and secrets. See Special Committee Report, supra note 4, at 26. The Special Com-
mittee believed that an attorney's fiduciary duty to a client demands that the disclosure of con-
fidential information be tightly controlled. See id.; see also REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1983) (describing attorney client fiduciary relationship).
68. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3)(1983).
The former Virginia CPR made mandatory the revelation of a fraud perpetrated by a client on a
third party. See VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(D)(1971). The revised
CPR allows the attorney to decide whether or not to reveal that a client has perpetrated a fraud
on a third party. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (3)
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may narrow a client's right to confidentiality.69 For example, ABA Rule
1.6(a) permits an attorney to disclose information about a client's case when
"impliedly authorized" by the circumstances of the case to carry out the re-
presentation.7" As a result, Rule 1.6(a) allows an attorney to substitute the at-
torney's judgment for the client's judgment in determining whether or not to
reveal information about the client's case. 7' Under the revised Virginia CPR,




Despite the emphasis on preserving client confidences and secrets in the
revised Virginia CPR, Canon Four of the revised CPR requires an attorney to
reveal confidential information in several instances. 3 For example, when a
client reveals that he or she has committed a fraud on any tribunal, Canon
Four requires an attorney to disclose the information to the appropriate court
or administrative agency. 7 In addition, a series of Virginia ethics opinions
have held that an attorney must disclose confidential client information when
the welfare of a child is at stake.7s Although no explicit basis for the child
welfare exception exists in either the former or revised Virginia CPR, Virginia
attorneys remain bound to reveal a client's confidences if a child's health or
safety is threatened. 76 Most significantly, Canon Four of the revised Virginia
CPR dictates that an attorney also must reveal confidential information if a
client communicates the intent to commit a crime.7 7 The attorney's obligation
(1983). Under the revised CPR, the fraud on the third party must be related to the subject matter
of the representation or the attorney cannot disclose the client's confidence. See id. In addition,
under the revised CPR, an attorney may use confidential information to establish the reasonable-
ness of the attorney's fees. Id. at DR 4-101(C) (4).
69. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Code Comparison) (1983) (re-
printed in 69 A.B.A.J. 1, 8 (Nov. 1983)) (Model Rules narrow principle of client confidentiality
in some areas).
70. See id. at Rule 1.6(a).
71. See id.; see also Outline of Presentations, Third Annual Disciplinary Conference,
Richmond, Va. (Sept. 7, 1983), Report on Canon Four of the Revised Virginia Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, at I (Comments of Prof. Thomas Shaffer, Washington & Lee University
School of Law).
72. See Revised Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(C)(1); see also
supra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining Special Committee's view of full disclosure in
DR 4-I01(C)(1)).
73. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(D) (1983).
74. See id. at DR 4-101(D) (2). Before revealing information regarding fraud on a tribunal,
an attorney must ask his or her client to voluntarily inform the tribunal autonomously. Id. In ad-
dition, prior to disclosing confidential information involving fraud on a tribunal, the client must
acknowledge that he or she perpretrated the fraud. Id.
75. See, e.g., Virginia Legal Ethics Comm., Informal Op. 292, VA. B. NEWS, Oct. 1978, at
23 (lawyer must reveal estate administrator's intent to embezzle funds when children are benefic-
iaries of estate); Virginia Legal Ethics Comm., Informal Op. 305, VA. B. NEWS, Oct. 1978, at 26
(attorney must disclose information on sexual abuse of children by client's husband); Virginia
Legal Ethics Comm., Informal Op. 345, VA. B. NEWS, Aug. 1979, at 64 (lawyer must reveal un-
favorable medical reports on client's fitness to have custody of children).
76. See Outline of Presentations, Third Annual Disciplinary Conference, Richmond, Va.
(Sept.. 7, 1983) (comments by Professor Thomas L. Shaffer on Canon 4, at 4-5).
77. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrry DR 4-101(D) (1). Under
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under DR 4-101 of the revised CPR to report any criminal intention presents a
significant departure from the standards of both the former Virginia CPR
and the new ABA Model Rules.7" Under the former Virginia CPR, an at-
torney had the option to disclose a client's criminal intent or to proceed with
the case and attempt to dissuade the client from perpetrating the crime. 9 The
standard set forth in ABA Model Rule 1.6, likewise, allows the attorney to
use discretion in determining whether or not to reveal confidential informa-
tion to prevent a client from committing a crime.80 Model Rule 1.6 states,
moreover, that the crime must be likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm before the attorney can exercise the option to reveal
the client's confidences.' Under the new Virginia CPR, the attorney does not
have a choice, but is required to reveal a client's intent to commit any
criminal act.82
Besides requiring an attorney to reveal client confidences in certain in-
stances, Canon Four of both the former and revised Virginia CPR also ad-
dresses the problem of when the lawyer's duty to preserve client confidences
and secrets ends. 3 Although the attorney/client privilege expires with the ter-
mination of the attorney's employment, EC 4-6 of the revised CPR advises
that an attorney's obligation to preserve a client's confidences and secrets
continues after employment ceases." Similarly, EC 4-6 of the revised CPR
DR 4-101(D) (1) of the revised CPR, the attorney has a duty to inform the client of the legal con-
sequences of the proposed crime, and to urge the client not to commit the crime. Id. In addition,
the attorney must advise the client of the attorney's obligation to reveal not only the client's
criminal intent, but also any information that might prevent the crime. Id. If the crime involves
perjury, the attorney must seek to withdraw as counsel. Id.
78. Compare id. at DR 4-101(D) with VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
4-101(C) (3) (1971) and MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1) (1983).
79. See VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (3) (1971) (attorney
was obligated to reveal criminal intent of client).
80. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1) (1983). The Model Rules
acknowledge that an attorney often may not "know" when a client intends to carry out a
heinous crime. See id. at Rule 1.6 Comment (Disclosure Adverse to Client). Thus, the lawyer
should base the decision whether to disclose a client's criminal intent on such factors as the
lawyer's relationship with the client, the parties whom the client may injure, the lawyer's own in-
volvement in the transaction, and any other extenuating circumstances. Id.
81. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1) (1983). Under the Model
Rules, if the client's criminal conduct is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, a
lawyer may, but is not obligated to, reveal confidential information. See id. at Rule 1.6 Com-
ment (Disclosure Adverse to Client). The Model Rules, however, prohibit an attorney from
assisting a client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. Id. at Rule 1.2(d).
82. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(D) (1) (1983).
The revised CPR emphasizes the attorney's duty to attempt to deter the client from committing a
crime before revealing confidential information to the proper authorities. See id.
83. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-6 (1983) (attorneys
have ethical obligation to preserve client confidentiality after termination of employment); see
also VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-6 (1971) (same).
84. REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-6 (1983) For example,
EC 4-6 of the revised CPR advises an attorney not to sell a law practice as an on-going business
since to do so would involve the disclosure of confidential client information. Id.
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also suggests that the death of a client does not end the attorney's moral duty
to protect confidential information."5 In addition, under both former and
revised versions of the Virginia CPR, public knowledge of a secret or con-
fidence does not affect an attorney's responsibility to refrain from discussing
confidential client information with persons to whom the privilege of confid-
entiality does not extend.8 6 Furthermore, in the event that an attorney must
withdraw from a case, conflicts of interest are eliminated but the withdrawal
increases the attorney's duty to preserve client secrets. 7 Although the Ethical
Considerations in Canon Four of the Revised Virginia CPR present only
minor changes from the former CPR, the Ethical Considerations continue to
offer meaningful guidelines to the Virginia practitioner on preserving client
confidences. 8 In contrast, the Comment to ABA Model Rule 1.6 merely
states that the duty of confidentiality continues after the termination of the
client-lawyer relationship, and provides no additional guidance to the legal
practitioner.
8 9
The revised Virginia CPR presents substantive changes not only in the
realm of client confidentiality (Canon Four) but also in the area of conflicts
of interest (Canons Five and Nine).8 0 Canon Five of the revised CPR provides
that an attorney should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf
of a client." In order to maintain the objectivity necessary to exercise in-
dependent professional judgment, the revised CPR states that an attorney
85. Id. The attorney also has an obligation to arrange for the disposition of clients' per-
sonal papers in the event of the attorney's retirement, disability, or death. Id. The attorney
should provide for the return of the client's files to the client, provide for the transfer of the files
to another attorney, or arrange for the destruction of the files. Id. The wishes and instructions of
the client should dictate the method of disposition. Id.
86. See id. at EC 4-2 (lawyer has social and professional duty to avoid discussing confid-
ential matters concerning clients). Ethical Consideration 4-2 of the revised CPR does permit an
attorney to discuss client confidences and secrets with associates or partners of the attorney's law
firm. Id.; see also T. Shaffer, Remarks on Cannon Four of the Revised Virginia Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, 1, 8 (July 29, 1983) (lawyer must preserve confidentiality even if substance
of secret becomes public knowledge); cf. VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-2
(1971) (attorney may not discuss confidential information regarding clients with others).
87. See T. Shaffer, Remarks on Canon Four of the Revised Virginia Code of Professional
Responsibility, 1, 8 (July 29, 1983).
88. See REVISED VmINIA CoDE OF PRoFEssioNAL REsPoNsmrrY EC 4-1 -4-6 (1983); cf.
VIRoUNA CODE OF PRoFEssIONAL REsPONsma TY EC 4-1 -4-6 (1971).
89. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 Comment (Former Client)
(1983).
90. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY Canons 5 & 9 (1983).
Canon 5 directs an attorney to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client.
Id. at Canon 5. To preserve independent professional judgment, an attorney must avoid conflicts
of interest in client representation. See id. at DR 5-105(A). Similarly, Canon nine dictates that
an attorney avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Id. at Canon 9. Therefore, a former gov-
ernment attorney should not accept private employment in a matter for which the attorney had
substantial responsibility as a public employee. Id. at DR 9-101(B).
91. See id. at Canon 5; supra note 90 (noting implications of Canon 5 on conflicts of inter-
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should avoid simultaneous representation of clients with conflicting inter-
ests. 92 For example, EC 5-17 advises an attorney to avoid simultaneous repre-
sentation of co-defendants in a criminal case, simultaneous representation of
beneficiaries of the same estate, and simultaneous representation of an in-
sured and insurer in a civil suit.9 3 Moreover, DR 5-105 of the revised CPR
prohibits an attorney from representing multiple clients with adverse interests
unless the attorney "obviously" can represent each client in an "adequate"
manner.' 4 In addition,, DR 5-105 demands that the attorney obtain informed
consent from each client after full disclosure of the adverse interests in-
volved.9' The new ABA Model Rules, on the other hand, require client con-
sent to multiple representation but do not necessitate that the lawyer "ob-
viously" be capable of "adequately" representing adverse clients. 96 Rather,
Model Rule 1.7 demands that the attorney himself reasonably believe that
representation of either client will not be adversely affected. 9" The revised Vir-
ginia CPR, thus, maintains a concrete, objective standard for determining
whether or not an attorney simultaneously may represent clients with adverse
interests." The ABA Model Rules, in contrast, present a flexible, subjective
standard on simultaneous representation which emphasizes the attorney's
ability to reasonably determine whether or not either client's interests will be
adversely affected. 99
92. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A) & (B)
(1983). The revised Virginia CPR defines differing interests as every interest that will adversely
affect the judgment of a lawyer or his loyalty to a client. Id. at Definitions. The differing interest
may be conflicting, inconsistent, or diverse. Id.
93. See id. at EC 5-17. An attorney should also avoid representing co-plaintiffs in personal
injury cases. Id.; see also Outline of Presentations, Third Annual Disciplinary Conference, Rich-
mond, Va. (Sept. 7, 1983), Report on Canon Five of the Revised Virginia Code of Professional
Responsibility (Comments by Dean Albert Turnbull, University of Virginia) (noting examples of
potentially differing interests). The revised Virginia CPR also provides, however, that an at-
torney may simultaneously represent clients with differing interests if the representation meets
two criteria. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C) (1983).
First, the attorney must show that she can adequately represent the interests of each client. Id.
Second, each client must consent to the representation after full disclosure of the possible adverse
consequences of simultaneous representation. Id.
94. See id. at DR 5-105(C). The revised Virginia CPR also mandates full disclosure to each
client. Id.; see also supra note 93 (discussing requirements of DR 5-105(C) of revised CPR).
95. See R EVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNSIBILITY DR 5-105(C) (1983); see
also supra note 93 (discussing requirement of DR 5-105(C) of revised CPR).
96. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7(a) (1983) (defining new ABA
general rule on conflicts of interest).
97. See id. at Rule 1.7(a)(1). Each client must consent to simultaneous representation of
clients with potentially conflicting interests after consultation. Id. at Rule 1.7(a)(2). In some cir-
cumstances, however, the attorney may be unable to make the disclosure necessary to obtain con-
sent. Id. at Rule 1.7 Comment (Consultation and Consent). For example, if informed consent re-
quires disclosure of confidential client information, Rule 1.7 prohibits the attorney from
disclosure if either client refuses to consent to the release of confidential data. Id.
98. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1983).
99. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 & Comment (1983).
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In addition to redefining the standard on simultaneous representation in
the revised Virginia CPR, the Special Committee added to Canon Five of the
revised CPR a provision governing the successive representation of potentially
adverse clients.' ° DR 5-105(D) of the revised CPR addresses the problem of
successive representation,' 0 ' and codifies judicial decisions barring successive
representation of clients with differing interests in two situations. 02 First, DR
5-105(D) prohibits successive representation of clients in the same matter when
the interests of the clients are adverse.' 3 Second, DR 5-105(D) bars successive
representation of clients in a substantially related matter if adverse interests
exist. 0 4 The revised Virginia CPR does not define a substantially related mat-
ter but courts have used the "substantial relationship" test for more than thirty
years.'
The substantial relationship test, as first announced in T.C. Theatre
Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,0 6 defines cases as "substantially related" if
the former client can show that during the former representation an attorney
might have acquired information pertinent to the subject matter of a subse-
quent representation. 0 7 When an attorney represents successive clients with
conflicting interests in substantially related matters, some courts have held as
an irrebuttable presumption that the attorney possesses confidential informa-
tion from the former client that may benefit the present client. 0 8 By codifying
the judicial decisions prohibiting successive representation in substantially
related matters, the framers of the revised Virginia CPR recognized that at-
torneys often will face a tension of duties between a new client and a former
100. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1983).
101. See id. Under the former Virginia CPR, no provision existed within Canon 5 to cover
the problem of conflicts of interest which may occur during the successive representation of dif-
ferent clients. See Outline of Presentations, Third Annual Disciplinary Conference, Richmond,
Va. (Sept. 7, 1983) (Comments of Dean A. Turnbull on Canon 5, at 8).
102. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1983); see
also infra note 108 and accompanying text (noting influential judicial decisions barring successive
representation of adverse clients).
103. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1983). In
order for a conflict of interest to exist in representing successive clients in the same or similar
matter, a new client's interest must be adverse to some material aspect of the former client's case.
Id. The former client has the option to consent to the representation after disclosure of the
potentially adverse consequences of the representation of a new client. Id.
104. See id. Clients involved in successive representation in a substantially related matter
also have the right to agree to the representation after disclosure of the possible adverse conse-
quences. Id.
105. See id. at Definitions (Revised CPR contains no definition of substantially related mat-
ter); see also Conflicts and Lawyer Disqualification, supra note 3, at 16 (describing history of
substantial relationship test).
106. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
107. See id. at 268-269 (defining substantially related matter as any information embraced
in former suit which may affect current representation).
108. See, e.g., NCK Organization Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1976) (Court
may assume attorney retains confidential data on former client if representation occurs in sub-
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client."0 9 The revised Virginia CPR gives new power to the former client who
now may request disqualification of an attorney in a subsequent case if a con-
flict of interest exists.110 Although the revised Virginia CPR contains no ex-
plicit procedural disqualification device, judicial precedent allows the former
client to request disqualification on a showing that a substantial relationship
exists between the subject matter of the former and present representations. I'
The prohibitions against subsequent representations as codified in DR
5-105(D) of the revised Virginia CPR may be somewhat limited, however, by
other influential judicial decisions.' 12 For example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler
Motors Corp. ' 3 declined to disqualify an attorney who had handled substan-
tially related matters when the facts of the case indicated that the individual
attorney did not have access to confidential information in the former repre-
sentation." ' The Second Circuit refused to take a blanket approach to the
stantially related area); Richardson v. Hamilton International Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385 (3d
Cir. 1972) (former client need not prove that attorney possesses confidential information); Emle
Industries Inc. v. Patentex Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 565 (2d Cir. 1973) (same); Cord v. Smith, 338
F.2d 516, 518 (9th Cir. 1964) (court may disqualify attorney from representing new client in sub-
stantially related matter even if no proof exists that attorney has confidential information); see
also Conflicts and Lawyer Disqualification, supra note 3, at 16 (client need not prove that at-
torney actually disclosed confidential information or that attorney acted in bad faith).
109. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1983); see
also id. at EC 5-15 (attorney must weigh possibility of impaired judgment or divided loyalty be-
fore making commitment to handle cases with potential for conflicting interest).
110. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFEssIoNAl. REsPoNsIILITr DR 5-105(D) (1983);
Outline of Presentations, Third Annual Disciplinary Conference, Richmond, Va. (Sept. 7, 1983)
(Comments by Dean Albert Turnbull on Canon 5, at 8-9) (former client may seek attorney dis-
qualification); see also Greene, Everybody's Doing It-But Who Should Be? Standing to Make
A Disqualification Motion Based On An Attorney's Representation of a Client with Interests
Adverse to Those of a Former Client, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 205, 205 (1983) (noting that
some courts have permitted non-client third parties to make attorney disqualification motions
based on conflict of interests). Under the revised Virginia CPR, an attorney should offer the
client an option to retain other counsel if a conflict of interests problem arises. See REVISED
VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16 (1983).
111. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1983); Out-
line of Presentations, Third Annual Disciplinary Conference, Richmond, Va. (Sept. 7, 1983)
(comments by Dean Albert Turnbull on Canon 5, at 8-9) (describing procedure for attorney dis-
qualification by former client in conflicts of interest cases).
112. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756 (2d Cir.
1975) (noting exception to rule prohibiting attorney participation in subsequent representation of
clients in substantially related matter); see also infra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing
Silver Chrysler case).
113. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
114. See id. at 756. In Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors Corp., an attorney had
been an associate with an 80 member firm which had represented Chrysler Motor Corp., the
automobile manufacturer. Id. The same attorney subsequently changed law firms and became in-
volved in a suit against Chrysler Motor Corp. Id. In the later suit, the attorney represented a
Chrysler dealership in an action against the Chrysler Motor Corp. for breach of contract. Id. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the attorney's involvement in the
previous representation did not mandate disqualification of the attorney for the law firm if the
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presumptive inference that an attorney possesses confidential information
concerning a former client merely because the former client employed the at-
torney in another matter.' 5 Instead, the Second Circuit established in Silver
Chrysler that the inference of receipt of confidential information should be
rebuttable." 6 The Second Circuit held, therefore, that a court need not dis-
qualify an attorney if the attorney can prove that he personally did not receive
confidential client information or work for the former client in an area
substantially related to the current representation.''
7
In a related conflicts of interest area, the revised Virginia CPR reinforces
the mandate of the former Virginia CPR with respect to vicarious disqualifi-
cation."8 DR 5-105(E) dictates that if an attorney must withdraw from a case
because of conflicting interests under DR 5-105, no partner or associate in the
same law firm may accept or continue employment with the case." 9 Thus, DR
5-105(E) of the revised CPR mandates an automatic disqualification of an en-
tire law firm if one attorney withdraws from a case due to the conflicting in-
terests of multiple clients. 1 20 Significantly, however, the Silver Chrysler case
affords opportunities for mobile lawyers to avoid personal and vicarious dis-
qualification by showing that the attorney personally did not work on the
substantially related matter, even if the attorney's former law firm did.' 2 '
Nevertheless, the vicarious disqualification provision of the revised CPR will
require Virginia law firms which hire laterally to examine carefully the nature
attorney could prove that he was not privy to confidential information substantially related to
the current litigation. Id.
115. See id. at 754-57.
116. See id. at 756.
117. See id.; see also Note, The Second Circuit and Attorney Disqualification-Silver
Chrysler Steers in a New Direction, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 130, 142-43 (1975) (after Silver
Chrysler courts should not disqualify attorneys unless matters were substantially related or con-
fidential information has been used).
118. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(E) (1983) (de-
fining conditions of vicarious liability under DR 5-105); cf. VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1971) (containing substantive material on vicarious liability under DR
5-105 of former CPR).
119. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(E) (1983); see
also id. at DR 5-105(A), (B), & (D) (barring subsequent representation of clients in same matter,
in substantially related matter, or in adverse matters).
120. See id. at DR 5-105(E); see also Outline of Presentations, Third Annual Disciplinary
Conference, Richmond, Va., Report on Canon Five of the Revised Virginia Code of Professional
Responsibility, (Sept. 7, 1983) (comments by Dean Albert Turnbull, University of Virginia, at 11).
The revised CPR mandates an automatic disqualification because the language of DR 5-105(E)
provides for no exceptions to the rule of vicarious disqualification in successive representations
of parties with adverse interests. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 5-105(E) (1983). But see Silver Chrysler, 518 F.2d at 757 (neither attorney nor law firm dis-
qualified due to conflicting interests with former client because attorney was not privy to confid-
ential information of former representation).
121. See 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1975); see also notes 114-20 and accompanying text
(discussing Silver Chrysler case).
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of prior work done and clients represented when experienced attorneys enter a
firm. 122
In contrast, the new ABA Model Rules provide a more liberal standard
for imputing disqualification to an entire law firm.I23 Model Rule 1.10 advises
that niembers of a law firm need not be vicariously disqualified if the firm can
preserve the former client's confidences and the firm avoids subsequent ad-
verse representation.124 Moreover, Model Rule 1.10 rejects the "appearance
of impropriety" standard contained in Canon Nine of the revised Virginia
CPR as a basis for determining vicarious disqualification.' 25 Describing the
appearance of impropriety standard as vague and subjective, the Comment to
Model Rule 1.10 advocates the use of a functional analysis in deciding
whether or not to disqualify vicariously an entire law firm due to adverse in-
terests.' 26
Similarly, Canon Nine of the revised Virginia CPR addresses the problem
of conflicts of interest and former government attorneys. 127 Canon Nine gen-
erally prohibits the appearance of professional impropriety by an attorney.2"
DR 9-101(B) of the revised Virginia CPR specifically bars former government
attorneys from accepting private employment in any matter in which the at-
torney had substantial responsibility as a public employee.' 29 The rationale
underlying the prohibition of DR 9-101(B) is that when a lawyer accepts em-
ployment in a substantially related field after leaving government service, the
lawyer creates an appearance of impropriety even if no impropriety exists. 3 0
Some courts have interpreted narrowly a similar prohibition in DR 9-101(B)
122. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(E) (1983); see
also Outline of Presentations, Third Annual Disciplinary Conference, Richmond, Va. (Sept. 7,
1983) (comments by Dean Albert Turnbull on Canon 5, at 11-12).
123. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983) (Imputed Disqualifica-
tion).
124. See id. at Rule 1.10 Comment (Lawyers Moving Between Firms). Although the provi-
sions of Rule 1.10 are similar to DR 5-105(E) of the revised Virginia CPR, Rule 1.10 allows
clients affected by possible adverse interests to waive the right to attorney disqualification. See
id. at Rule 1.10(d). DR 5-105(E) of the revised Virginia CPR does not allow for client waiver of
the right to disqualify. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
5-105(E) (1983).
125. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 Comment (Lawyers Moving
Between Firms) (1983).
126. See id. Moreover, the ABA Model Rules' rejection of the appearance of impropriety
standard reflects the recent reluctance of some courts to disqualify attorneys solely under Canon
Nine of the 1969 ABA Model Code. See Board of Education v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1243 (2d
Cir. 1979) (rejecting as vague appearance of impropriety standard); International Electric Corp.
v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1292 (2d Cir. 1975) (attorney's misconduct must reflect actual wrong-
doing rather than mere appearance of wrongdoing).
127. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101(B) (1983) (pro-
viding conflict of interests guidelines for former government attorneys). Canon 9 dictates that a
lawyer must avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Id. at Canon 9.
128. See id. at Canon 9.
129. Id. at DR 9-101(B).
130. See id. at EC 9-3.
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of the 1969 ABA Model Code as precluding subsequent representation even in
situations where an attorney moves from the public to the private sector but
remains on the same side of the case.' 31 Other courts have found the ap-
pearance of impropriety standard unduly harsh,' 32 and have focused instead
on the meaning of the terms "matter" and "substantial responsibility" as ap-
plied to former government attorneys.' 33 However, neither the 1969 ABA
Model Code nor the revised Virginia CPR provides a test by which a former
government attorney can determine whether his or her subsequent employ-
ment involves "substantial responsibility" for the same "matter" as under-
taken in the attorney's former government employment.' 34 Some courts have
determined that the same "matter" occurs when both the prior and current
representations involved similar facts.' 3 A leading ABA Ethics Opinion, For-
mal Opinion 342,136 defined "matter" as used in DR 9-101(B) as a single
transaction or set of transactions involving the same parties and the same situ-
ation.' 37 Formal Opinion 342 also defined the term "substantial responsibil-
ity" as personal involvement by an attorney to an important, material degree
in investigations about or deliberations on the transactions or facts in ques-
tion. 3 Thus, some courts have avoided disqualifying a former government
attorney on the basis of the Canon Nine prohibition against the appearance of
impropriety if the attorney can prove that he or she lacked personal involve-
ment in a prior representation. 39 In revising the Virginia CPR, the Special
Committee did not adopt any of the recent Ethics Committee definitions of
131. See General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2nd Cir. 1974) (attorney
barred from participating as plaintiff's counsel in private sector antitrust suit when attorney had
participated as plaintiff's counsel for government against same defendant in previous suit). The
policy underlying the prohibition against subsequent representation is to avoid any implication
that the promise of future employment in the private sector may have influenced a government
attorney's actions as a public official. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances,
Formal Op. 37 (1931) (explaining rationale underlying DR 9-101(3)).
132. See People v. Municipal Court, 69 Cal. App. 3d 714, 718, 138 Cal. Rptr. 235, 238
(1977) (criminal defendant's right to choose counsel outweighs appearance of impropriety even
though attorney also held position of city councilman); Island Pa-Vin Corp. v. Klinger, 76 Misc.
2d 180, 184, 363 N.Y.S.2d 836, 837 (1975) (court cannot deprive party in civil action of counsel
of choice unless actual conflict of interests exists). But see In re Estate of Trench, 349 N.Y.S.2d
265, 271-72 (1973) (appearance of impropriety is sufficient to disqualify attorney even if client
consents to representation).
133. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 650 (2d Cir. 1974)
(defining "matter" as similarity of facts in prior and current representations); Telos, Inc. v.
Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 (D. Hawaii 1975) (preparation and signing of com-
plaint by attorney constitutes "substantial responsibility" for case).
134. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101 (B) (1969) (failing to pro-
vide test to determine when "substantial responsibility" existed in prior public service); cf. RE-
VISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITy DR 9-101(B) (1971) (same).
135. See General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 650-52 (2d Cir. 1974)
(defining term "matter" in current and prior representations).
136. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975).
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975)
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the terms contained in DR 9-101(B).1' ° Whether or not a former government
attorney will be disqualified under the appearance of impropriety standard of
the revised CPR will depend, therefore, on current judicial interpretation . 41
The framers of the new ABA Model Rules, in contrast, rejected as vague
the appearance of impropriety standard contained in Canon Nine of the re-
vised Virginia CPR and the 1969 ABA Model Code. 142 In formulating the new
Model Rules, the framers sought to include concrete guidelines for former
government attorneys. 43 Under the new ABA Models Rules, Rule 1.11 gov-
erns successive government and private employment.'I" Model Rule 1.11 pro-
vides a more clearly defined guideline for attorney conduct than DR 9-101(B)
of the revised CPR in that Model Rule 1.11 embraces the standard set forth in
ABA Formal Opinion 342.145 Model Rule 1.11 specifically allows a former
(interpretations of DR 9-101(B) should emphasize lawyer's personal participation rather than his
or her presumptive knowledge of representation); cf. Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New York,
Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. No. 889, 31 Rec. Ass'n B. City N.Y. 552,
563-64 (1976). The New York Committee agreed with ABA Formal Opinion 342, but noted that
an automatic "appearance of impropriety" might exist if an attorney had been a supervisor of
a government branch. See id. at 563-64. The Committee concluded, however, that each case turned
on an analysis of the facts, and that a court should not preclude an attorney, formerly employed as a
government agency supervisor, from accepting a subsequent case if the attorney's relationship to
the subject matter had been purely technical, if the subject matter had been routine and had in-
volved no policy determination, and if the attorney could demonstrate lack of access to relevant
government information. Id.; see also ABA Annot. Code of Professional Responsibility, 426-27
(1979) (analyzing meaning of "substantial responsibility" in prior public employment).
,140. See REvISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 and Definitions
(1983) (failing to state standards for determining meaning of "substantial responsibility" and
"matter" in DR 9-101(B)); see also supra note 133 and accompanying text (noting examples of
how some courts have defined "substantial responsibility" and "matter" as applied to former
government attorneys).
141. See, e.g., Virginia Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 182 (January 27, 1978) (adopting
ABA Formal Opinion 342 as standard for determining "substantial responsibility" and
"matter" as applied to former government attorneys); see also supra text accompanying notes
128-30 (citing definitions contained in ABA Formal Opinion 342); supra note 133 and accom-
panying text (noting alternative definitions of "substantial responsibility" and "matter").
142. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (Lawyers Moving Between
Firms) (1983). The framers of the Model Rules rejected the appearance of impropriety standard
on two grounds. See id. First, the framers believed that the appearance of impropriety standard
was too general, and would allow a former client to request an attorney's disqualification on a
purely subjective basis. See id. Second, the term "impropriety" remains undefined and thus a
lawyer has no standard by which to judge his or her own conduct. See id.; see also Conflicts and
Lawyer Disqualification, supra note 3, at 15 (noting rejection of appearance of impropriety stan-
dard by framers of ABA Model Rules).
143. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11(b) (c) & (d) (1983) (adding
three new sections to rules governing former government attorneys to provide specific guidelines
for screening process and subsequent employment); see also supra note 142 and accompanying
text (discussing Model Rules' rejection of appearance of impropriety standard).
144. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 (1983).
145. See id. at Rule 1.11(a). The subsequent representation must include a matter in which
the attorney participated personally and substantially as a government employee. Id.; see also




government attorney to represent a private client unless the subsequent repre-
sentation involves a matter in which the lawyer participated "personally and
substantially" as a government employee.' 4 In addition, even if the former
government attorney was involved personally and substantially in a prior
government representation, Model Rule 1.11 allows the attorney to continue
to represent a private client in a subsequent related matter if the government
agency consents after consultation. 14 7 DR 9-101(B) of the revised CPR, in
contrast, prohibits a former government attorney from representing a private
party in a matter for which the attorney had substantial responsibility,
regardless of whether or not the government agency would be willing to con-
sent to the subsequent representation.'
4 8
Another significant aspect of new ABA Model Rule 1.11 is the addition
by the framers of a definition for the term "matter," a controversial term
under DR 9-101(B) of the 1969 ABA Model Code and the former Virginia
CPR."' 9 Model Rule 1.11(d) defines "matter" for the former government at-
torney as any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling,
contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other
particular matter involving a specific party or parties."10 Because the framers
of the ABA Model Rules clarified the meaning of "matter" in Model Rule
1.11(d), states that adopt the new Model Rules will not have to rely on the
often inconsistent judicial interpretation of the appearance of impropriety
standard for the government attorney. 15 More importantly, Model Rule 1. 11
provides a concrete guideline to assist former government attorneys in deter-
mining whether or not a potential conflict of interest may exist in a subse-
quent representation.
5 2
Similarly, Model Rule 1.11 also provides standards for determining when
a law firm may be disqualified vicariously due to the presence in the law firm
of a former government attorney. 53 Model Rule 1.11(a) provides that if a
former government attorney is barred from participating in a subsequent rep-
resentation under the terms of Model Rule 1.11(a), no other member of the
law firm may undertake or continue the representation unless two conditions
are met."' First, the law firm must screen the disqualified lawyer from any
participation in the case. 155 Second, the law firm must give prompt notice to
146. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11(a) (1983).
147. See id.
148. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101(B) (1983).
149. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11(d) (1) & (2) (1983).
150. See id. at 1.11(d) (1). The definition of "matter" under Model Rule 1.11(d) also in-
cludes any matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government agency.
Id. at 1.11(d) (2).
151. See id. at 1.11(d); see also supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text (noting differing
judicial interpretations of appearance of impropriety standard and its application to former
government attorneys).
152. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 l(a) (b) & (d) (1983).
153. See id. at 1.11(a).
154. Id.
155. See id. at 1.11(a)(1). In addition, the ABA Model Rules require a law firm to ensure
that the disqualified attorney receives no portion of the fee earned from the case. Id.
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the appropriate government agency, apprising the agency of the presence in
the law firm of the former government attorney. 5 6 The underlying premise of
the new ABA Model Rule 1.11 is the protection of the government's legiti-
mate need to attract qualified attorneys while at the same time maintaining
the attorneys' high ethical standards.' 7 The provisions in Rule 1.11 for
screening and waiver are necessary to prevent the disqualification rule from
imposing too severe a deterrent on attorneys who may wish to enter public
service.
Canon Nine of the revised Virginia CPR, on the other hand, contains no
explicit provisions which would mandate the vicarious disqualification of an
entire law firm due to the employment of a former government attorney. '
Both ABA and Virginia Ethics Opinions have determined, however, that in
certain situations the presence of a former government attorney in a law firm
may vicariously disqualify all the members of a firm.3 9 In addition, a series
of ethics opinions has held that a law firm may avoid disqualification in some
cases by establishing in-house screening procedures which preclude the dis-
qualified government attorney from any contact with the pertinent repre-
sentation.' 60 Thus, the rule governing vicarious disqualification for Virginia
law firms employing former government attorneys is derived from judicial in-
terpretation and ethics opinions rather than from the explicit language of
Canon Nine of the Revised Virginia CPR.'6' In contrast, the framers of the
156. See id. at 1.11 (Comment). The framers of Model Rule 1.11 sought to prevent a subse-
quent private client from benefiting from the confidential information obtainable in a public
agency. Id.
157. Id. The framers of the ABA Model Rules believed that the rules governing former and
current government attorneys should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to
and from the government. Id.
158. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1983) (contain-
ing no explicit directive on vicarious disqualification of law firm that employs a former govern-
ment attorney); cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIBTrY Canon 9 (1969) (same).
159. See Virginia Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 182 (January 27, 1978) (delineating cir-
cumstances under which presence of disqualified former government attorney in law firm will
disqualify entire firm); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 342 (1975) (describing basis for vicarious disqualification at law firm that hires former gov-
ernment attorney).
160. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975)
(describing procedure for creating in-house screen for former government attorney to avoid
vicarious disqualification of firm). The in-house screening process includes prohibiting the dis-
qualified former government attorney from any contact with the pertinent representation and ob-
taining approval from the affected government agency regarding the effectiveness of the screen-
ing process. Id. In addition, Virginia Formal Opinion 182 requires a government agency that
refuses to waive disqualification to submit written reasons for doing so. See Virginia Legal Ethics
Comm., Formal Op. 182 (January 27, 1978). Moreover, Formal Opinion 182 prohibits the agency
from arbitrarily refusing to waive disqualification. Id.
161. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 and DR
9-101(B) (1983) (containing no explicit procedural device for vicarious disqualification of law
firm); see also supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text (discussing ethics opinions which delin-




new ABA Model Rules have provided express procedural guidelines for vicar-
ious disqualification of a law firm in Model Rule 1.11.162
Despite the controversy surrounding the drafting and adoption of the
new ABA Model Rules, the Model Rules present a number of needed changes
in the current law of ethics.' 63 For example, the Model Rules define new
guidelines for determining when a conflict of interest exists, provide concrete
standards for vicarious disqualification of law firms, and set policies estab-
lishing when a lawyer may reveal a client's confidences."'" Likewise, the adop-
tion of the revised Virginia CPR presents a number of important ramifica-
tions for Virginia attorneys. Although the VSB Special Committee rejected
the design of the new ABA Model Rules, the revised CPR contains many sig-
nificant substantive changes, especially in the area of client confidentiality
and conflict of interests."' Canon Four of the revised CPR re-emphasizes the
attorney's duty to preserve client confidences and secrets in most circum-
stances, but also directs an attorney to reveal a client's intention to commit
any criminal act.' 66 While the VSB Special Committee may have hoped the
disclosure requirement would deter clients' criminal actions and thereby pro-
tect the public from crime, Canon Four's mandate than an attorney must re-
veal a client's criminal intent may cause many ethical dilemmas for Virginia
attorneys. " ' The revisions of Canon Five, however, demonstrate clearly the
guidelines for attorneys involved in simultaneous or successive representations
of clients with adverse interests.' 68 In addition, Canon Five stresses the im-
portance of resolving potential conflict of interests problems at an early stage
of the representation. 169 Besides protecting the client, early resolution of con-
162. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 & Comment (1983) (describing
procedural process for vicarious disqualification of law firm that employs attorneys with prior
government service).
163. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983); see also supra notes 25-27 and
accompanying text (describing controversy surrounding adoption of new ABA Model Rules).
164. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8 (1983) (defining stand-
ards for determining if conflict of interests exists); id. at Rule 1.11 (providing guideline for vic-
arious disqualification of law firms); id. at Rule 1.6 (setting new policies for preserving client
confidences).
165. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canons 4 & 5 (1983); see
also supra notes 58-90 and accompanying text (noting changes in revised CPR regarding client
confidentiality); supra notes 91-162 and accompanying text (describing modifications to rules
governing conflicts of interest in revised CPR).
166. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1983); see also
supra notes 58-90 and accompanying text (describing changes to Canon Four of Revised CPR).
167. See Outline of Presentations, Third Annual Disciplinary Conference, Richmond, Va.
(Sept. 7, 1983) (Comments by Prof. Thomas L. Shaffer on Canon 4, at 4).
168. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon Five (1983); see
also supra notes 91-162 and accompanying text (discussing additions and reyisions to Canon Five
of revised CPR).
169. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon Five (1983); see
also supra notes 91-162 and accompanying text (discussing guidelines for attorneys in resolving
conflict of interest problems).
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Although the VSB Special Committee chose not to embrace the format or
substance of the new ABA Model Rules, the revised CPR does provide an
interpretation of some important judicial decisions that have affected the self-
regulation of the legal profession. 7 ' The revised Virginia CPR has updated
provisions governing attorney conduct in a number of areas.' 72 First, the
revised CPR presents a new standard for determining when attorney miscon-
duct occurs.' 73 In addition, the revised CPR has liberalized rules regarding at-
torney advertising and solicitation of employment. 74 Furthermore, the revised
CPR has incorporated the holdings of judicial decisions which prohibited
state bar associations from setting minimum fee schedules. 75 Finally, the
revised CPR has modified significantly the standards by which an attorney
must judge his or her duty to preserve client confidences, and has incor-
porated judicial decisions governing potential conflicts of interest.
76
As a result of the modifications to the substantive areas of the revised
Virginia CPR, Virginia practitioners will experience a number of changes in
required standards of ethical conduct. 77 One of the significant changes the re-
vised CPR mandates is the requirement that a Virginia attorney must report a
client's intention to commit any criminal act.'78 In addition, the revised CPR
codifies judicial decisions barring successive representation of clients in the
same matter, or a substantially related matter, when adverse interests exist. t7
Moreover, the revised CPR differs substantially from the former CPR by per-
mitting attorney advertising and public communication, and by setting forth
170. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15 (1983) (recom-
mending that lawyer representing clients with adverse interests withdraw from litigation).
171. See President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEWS, June 1983, at 11-12 (noting changes in revised
Virginia CPR).
172. See id. at 11; see also supra text accompanying notes 12-17 (discussing need for revi-
sions to former Virginia CPR).
173. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A) (4) (1983).
DR 1-102(A) (4) states that an attorney must not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation which reflects adversely on his or her fitness to practice law. Id.
174. See id. at DR 2-101 -2-103 (redefining guidelines for attorney publicity, advertising, let-
terheads, and solicitation of employment); see also President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEWS, June 1983,
at 10.
175. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-105 (1983) (estab-
lishing new guidelines for fee setting practices).
176. See id. at Canon 4 & Canon 5; see also supra notes 58-90 and accompanying text
(discussing changes in standards governing client confidences and secrets in Revised CPR); supra
notes 91-162 and accompanying text (discussing modifications to rules in revised CPR regarding
potential conflict of interests).
177. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canons 1, 2, 4 & 5
(1983); see also supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text (noting additional modifications to
substantive areas of revised CPR).
178. See REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(D) (1) (1983).
179. See id. at DR 5-105(D).
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the "fitness to practice law" guideline as the new standard of ethical conduct
by which Virginia attorneys will be measured.' 8 °
As a whole, the revised Virginia CPR represents a concise, streamlined
version of the former CPR while at the same time adopting necessary new
standards governing the self-regulation of the legal profession. 8' In retro-
spect, the decision of the VSB Special Committee to retain the 1969 ABA
Model Code format was wise in light of the negative reaction that has met the
proposal and adoption of the new ABA Model Rules.' Although some states
may elect to adopt the design of the new ABA Model Rules, Virginia's revised
CPR is currently consistent with the structure of ethical codes of other
states.' 8 3 Should other state bar associations decide to enact the ABA Model
Rules, Virginia attorneys with interstate practices may face conflicting stan-
dards of required ethical conduct. At the present time, however, the VSB
Special Committee has succeeded in providing a useful resource document for
Virginia attorneys while also emphasizing a client-centered approach to solv-
ing ethical problems.' 84
MARY MADIGAN
180. See id. at DR 2-101 -2-103 (setting new guidelines for attorney advertising and public
communication); id. at DR 1-102 (A) (4) (establishing fitness to practice law standard in revised
CPR).
181. See Special Committee Report, supra note 4, at 5 (noting that one goal of Special
Committee was to present simplified document for use by Virginia attorneys).
182. See President's Page, 31 VA. B. NEws, June 1983, at 11 (noting lack of approval for
new ABA Model Rules at 1981 and 1982 ABA Annual Meetings); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 24-27 (describing controversy surrounding adoption of new ABA Model Rules).
183. Compare REVISED VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983) (updating
Virginia's version of 1969 ABA Model Code) with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILI-
TY (1969) (providing model upon which current state ethical codes are based).
184. See Outline of Presentations, Third Annual Disciplinary Conference, Richmond, Va.
(Sept. 7, 1983) at 4-5 (outlining goals for revision of Virginia CPR).
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